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Book Review of
Reconstructing Economic Theory:
The Problem of Human Agency,
by Allen Oakley
John B. Davis
Department of Economics, Marquette University
Milwaukee, WI

The premise of Oakley's recent book is that the concept and
representation of the individual in mainstream economic theory is
sufficiently unrealistic and inadequate that rather than another critique
of this concept what is most needed is a pre-substantive,
metatheoretical investigation of the ontological foundations of what it
means to be a human agent. He undertakes this project pursuant to a
larger aim of reconstructing economic theory as a more humanistic
economics, and envisages a three-stage inquiry that includes, first, an
examination of what is distinctive about human agency, second,
attention to the consequent methodological requirements this implies,
and third, a treatment of the epistemology this would entail.
Reconstructing Economic Theory is devoted to the first of these stages,
seen as prior and most fundamental. Oakley believes this investigation
properly belongs within an agency-structure framework, but puts aside
detailed consideration of the social, institutional, and other structural
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influences operating on individuals to analyze human agency in terms
of what he characterizes as typical inherited and given situations
(pp. 3-4). He then gives critical primacy to three principles that
operate – albeit in a highly constricted manner - in mainstream
economics' positivist metatheory: folk psychology, agent rationality,
and situational analysis. The book is thus devoted to providing a
deeper investigation of these principles, and this is carried out in
connection with the examination of the ideas of four individuals who
Oakley regards as having made important contributions to
understanding the ontological character of human agency: Alfred
Schutz, Karl Popper, George Shackle, and Herbert Simon. In effect,
the book constitutes groundwork for a full theory of the human agent
based on this motivated survey. The introductory and concluding
chapters provide overview and synthesis, but the bulk of the
discussion is dedicated to seven chapters on these four individuals. I
briefly review these discussions in order to show their thread, and
provide a basis for comment on Oakley's general project.
The focus for Schutz is the subjective or actor's point of view as
contrasted with the perspective of the social scientist. Individual
agents are isolated, self-conscious beings able to bracket out the world
about them in reflexively attending to their own streams of
consciousness. To order their worlds they engage in a process of
typification whereby they give meaning to their social locations and
intersubjective relationships with others. Intersubjective relationships
are themselves characterized in terms of distance, ranging from those
who are close enough that subjective experiences are shared to those
who are only functional types. Oakley sees Schutz's framework as
sympathetic to the general principles of situational analysis in its
emphasis on individuals choosing and acting in conditioned and
structured environment, but he faults Schutz for not giving that
environment detailed investigation. He also praises Schutz for seeing
human cognition as limited in virtue of subjective perspective and
experience, but sees him as failing to consider how individuals might
respond to their knowledge being incomplete and fallible. Combining
these criticisms, Oakley would like to see more attention to the
complex and often conflictual nature of social strucmres, and how
individuals negotiate them.
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Popper, then, with situational analysis as the centerpiece of his
understanding of human agency, is the natural figure to rum to for a
finer appreciation of the ontology of situated agency. Moreover, Oakley
believes, much of the examination, critical or otherwise, of Popper's
situational analysis has emphasized him as a methodologist of science
to the neglect of the ontological content of Popper's writings. This is
thus pursued through an examination of Popper's emphasis on
individuals being free and autonomous and in terms of his threeworlds representation of the human situation, which Oakley believes
particularly valuable in providing potential foundations for an onto
logically informed situational analysis. In the three-worlds view, world
1 is physical reality, world 2 is all our subjective processes, and world
3 is all the accumulated and recorded products of human intellecmal
activity. World 2 is positioned between worlds 1 and 3. Oakley allows
that this vision is only a simple sketch, but also believes exposing its
limits creates possibilities for augmenting it so as to make allowance
for the “shortfalls in agents' relevant knowledge and for deficiencies in
their cognitive capacities, for the complexity and temporality of the
circumstances with which agents must contend, and for the intricate
social, institutional and other dimensions of the situations” in which
they operate (p. 79).
These last words are an obvious introduction to Shackle, whose
ideas are next discussed. Oakley is particularly interested in Shackle
as having defined economics as a humanistic social science, where this
particularly involves the idea that human agents are subjective beings
who are existentially free and creative though who also have limited
knowledge and cognitive capacities. This creativity is associated with
the problem of future time and the consequent need for imagination in
decision-making. Shackle was of course also a relentless critic of
neoclassical theory which he saw as infected with mechanical notions
and reasoning. At the same time, Oakley argues, Shackle's vision of
time and uncertainty was so radical as to render the individual an
isolated, solitary being. He was, that is, “no social ontologist” (p. 146),
but one who failed to explain situational conditioning as an objective
dimension to choice and action. This led him at times to the
unfortunate recourse of suggesting strategies for formalizing the
behavioral functions in his models of choice, a notion entirely at odds
with the main emphasis in his thinking. Shackle thus posed crucial
History of Economic Ideas, Vol 12, No. 3 (Fabrizio Serra Editore): pg. 132-135. Publisher Link. This article is © Fabrizio
Serra Editore and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Fabrizio Serra
Editore does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the
express permission from Fabrizio Serra Editore.

3

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

questions associated with the ontological character of human
subjectivity, but he did so in such strong terms as to make nihilism the
message. Inadvertently, then, he points us toward the question of how
we are to understand human situatedness.
Thus last taken up is Simon, who at the outset of his career
explicitly argued that understanding individuals' cognitive and
knowledge limitations also entailed developing a theory of
organizations which provide human agents prestructured and reliable
frameworks of action. Oakley notes that later in life Simon admitted he
“backed away from studying organizations and big economic systems”
to focus more on individual decision-making (Simon 1986, 24), but
nonetheless treats Simon's conception of human agency as situated
agency, and argues that it is from this perspective that his thinking
about procedural and bounded rationality should be viewed. Indeed,
Simon's increasing hostility as his career progressed to 'armchair
economics' that ignored the evidence regarding how individuals
actually made decisions continually reminds us of the social context in
which decision-making occurs. Thus the limits of rationality, he
argued, are associated with the “goal identifications” agents have,
which are themselves a product of their locations in organizations.
Social roles, moreover, are adaptive and emergent dimensions of
agents' actions, rather than determining. All this, clearly, is an
advance on providing a sound situational analysis metatheory for
economics. Oakley has few hesitations, then, about Simon's
contribution, though he does note that Simon errs in missing the
ontological nature of limitations on individual action, and that Simon's
observations are often highly programmatic.
Where, then, does this tour of contributions yet half-steps leave
us? Oakley uses his last chapter to draw together the threads. The
broad themes reviewed include real time, self-consciousness, limited
cognitive capacity, typification, imagination, contingency, and
situatedness. But it is the last theme to which he has continually been
pointing in his review of those contributors who for all their insights
never entirely grasp, he believes, that radical human subjectivity is
ultimately meaningless - perhaps nihilistic - apart from an attention to
social structures which frame it. What, then, can complete this partial
picture they offer? Here, Oakley introduces, at almost the last
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moment, the work of Anthony Giddens (pp. 201-208), a leading
proponent of agency-structure thinking, as a possible framework for
explaining situatedness. Giddens understands social structure to
exercise both enabling and constraining effects on human agents
which are exhibited in terms of dual-sided accounts of rules and social
identities. For Oakley the key in this is the idea of “a balance in the
origins of human conduct between existential, psychologically based
contingency and situational containment” (p. 208). He then closes his
discussion with strong reminders that there remains a high degree of
contingency in human action reflecting the inescapably open nature of
our choices.
But has he, in fact, shown us what is involved in a balance
between subjectivity and social constraint? Giddens' enablingconstraining reasoning is at such a high level of generality as to be
virtually incontestable. Social structures influence action and vice
versa. Even neoclassical economists could subscribe to this. The idea
of a “balance” between “existential, psychologically based contingency
and situational containment” (p. 208) is itself largely metaphorical,
and, as it turns, out there is little in Oakley's remaining discussion that
tells us how such a balance might be understood. He does appear to
have a view of how this balance might be investigated when he
emphasizes the importance of investigating social relationships as a
means of understanding situatedness.
Three intimately linked aspects of the situations of agents are of
concern in this section. First, we need to establish what is known
about the primary situational conditions of agents in the form of their
intersubjective and sodal relationships with other agents.
(p. 197; emphasis added)

(The other two aspects concerns the extent to which these
relationships are the product of external structures and the
multidimensional nature of the external environment.) But this
suggestion is never followed-up or further developed, and indeed
Oakley almost always substitutes situatedness or the general idea of
social structure for attention to how individuals exist and act within
intersubjective relationships with other particular individuals. That is,
there is no account of the relational aspects of individual life. Indeed
the closest the book comes to such a discussion is in the treatment of
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Schutz on social distance. But Schutz's radical subjectivity quickly
casts most social relationships into the sphere of types, so that there
is never any real engagement with other individuals in relationships
which might remove the human agent from a state of existential
isolation. Thus, situatedness ends up being simply a more
philosophical conception of constraint on individuals with at best
incidental connection to what is specifically social in individual life. This
seems to argue against Oakley's original strategy of seeking to
establish what is distinctive about human agency apart from social
interaction. It does not, however, argue against the idea of an
ontological point of view, since social embeddedness and the relational
character of life is no less an existential reality than the need to act in
an uncertain, open world.
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